Rossignol for Pierre

joerookery

Well-known member
Pierre do you have anything in your picture thing about Rossignol, the French third colonial infantry division or the battle on 22 August 1914? I looked but could find nothing on your site. So I thought I would ask. Thanks! :cry:
 
Well Joe, right now I don't know that specifically, if I have something of the kind, but I will search my photo collection and elsewhere, like for instance the French JMO's. Please, have some patience, Joe. :wink: I try at my best.
 
Hi Joe,

Your question is not easy to answer; it is quite an enigma. There is no village in France with the name of Rossignol to be found in the Michelin atlas of France, nor on Géoportail or IGN. The only place I know of, is Rossignol Wood in the northern Somme front sector. Rossignol (“Nightingale) Wood near Hébuterne is mentioned in the photo page about Gommecourt, http://pierreswesternfront.punt.nl/index.php?r=1&id=414521&tbl_archief=0 , but only in relation to the events of July 1916. Rossignol Wood was taken by the Germans at the end of March 1918 and recovered in July 1918.

I went to study on the internet the War Journal of the 3e Division d’ Infanterie Coloniale. Unfortunately the war journal of the 3e D.I.C. starts at 24 August 1914 and not on the 22nd. The War Journal tells that on the 24th the units of the 3e D.I.C. were united at Margut and the Divisional General Headquarters was installed at Olizy sur Chiers. These villages are located near Stenay, along the right bank of the Meuse, north of Verdun, and south-east of Sedan.
I can hardly imagine that the 3e D.I.C. was able to fight a battle near Gommecourt and Hébuterne at the 22th in the Somme sector and marched from the west in one day to the east, to the Meuse river, a distance in direct bird’s flight of 199 kilometres. The war journal ends alas at the end of August.
The 3e D.I.C. stays in this sector until half September 1914. Then the 3e D.I.C was transported to the Champagne Sector, to Ville sur Tourbe. The war journal continues the story with the events of 15 and 16 May 1915 around the Main de Massiges and Ville sur Tourbe.

Maybe I misinterpreted your question, Joe, or I did not understand your question quite well. My excuses then. But perhaps you could be more specific about your question, Joe, so I might be able to help you better than now. I will look further on for period photo’s of the 3e D.I.C. and the war journals, if these still exist, of it’s regimental units.
 
On second thought, you will probably mean Rossignol , Belgium?!
The 3e DIC is mentioned as one of the fighting units in the French Wikipedia. I will translate the content for you later and check it out.
 
A text fragment from the French Wikipedia in my modest translation:
The Fourth French army had been ordered to go on an axis-line Gedinne-Paliseul and Bertrix-Offagne- Florenville.
It therefore extends over several lines, including two assigned to the Corps Colonial.
The 3rd Colonial Infantry Division along the axis Gérouville-Neufchâteau and the 5th Colonial Infantry Brigade (Colonial Reserve Corps) on the axis Suxy-Neufchâteau.
On it’s left, the 23rd Infantry Division of the 12th Army Corps advances on the axis by Léglise-Bellefontaine and Tintigny.
On it’s right is the 2nd Army Corps, which is progressing towards Virton.
In the second step is in held in reserve the 2nd colonial Infantry Division, which recevied orders as not to exceed Jamoigne.
On the morning of 22 August 1914, both units attacked on a line of German defense established along the valley of the Semois, in a forest near Chiny-Neufchâteau occupied by the Sixth Army Corps of the Third Army von Hausen.
Taken in that the forest is hardly penetrable, the Corps Colonial had great difficulty in deploying it’s troops and experienced significant losses.
It is still forced in a defensive but at the end of the day, the Germans encircle the French and force the Fourth Army to withdraw.
The retreat, however, has been made in good order with coordination instructions to remain at the front Lines of Third and the Fifth Army to avoid any threat on their flank.
This retreat in good order will be decisive at the Battle of the Marne .

At last this info will help a bit, Joe? Although, now I don't understand exactly the connection anymore with the content of the War Journals, I mentioned?! :twisted: :cry: But, considered the route of the retreat and it's temporarily stay on the 24th it is exactly south on the map from the valley of the Semois river along the Belgian border. That would make sense, I suppose.
 
Re-edited follow up: from the French Wikipedia the Battle Order at Rossignol:
Le Corps colonial [modifier]
2e Division d'infanterie coloniale

2e Brigade d'infanterie coloniale
4e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Toulon)
8e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Toulon)
4e Brigade d'infanterie coloniale
22e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Marseille)
24e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Perpignan)

Éléments organiques divisionnaires :
1er Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne Colonial.
5e escadron du 6e Régiment de Dragons
compagnie 22/1 du 1er Régiment du génie

3e Division d'Infanterie Coloniale

1re Brigade d'infanterie coloniale
1er Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Cherbourg)
2e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Brest)
3e Brigade d'infanterie coloniale
3e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Rochefort)
7e Régiment d'Infanterie Coloniale (Bordeaux)

Éléments organiques divisionnaires :
2e Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne Colonial.
6e escadron du 6e Régiment de Dragons
compagnie 22/3 du 1er Régiment du génie

Éléments non endivisionnés (ENE)

5e Brigade d'infanterie coloniale
21e Régiment d'infanterie coloniale (Paris)
23e Régiment d'infanterie coloniale (Paris
3e Régiment de chasseurs d'Afrique
3e Régiment d'artillerie coloniale (Lorient)
Compagnies 22/2, 22/4, 22/16, 22/31 du 1e Régiment du génie.

Allemagne

Le VIe Corps d'armée (Breslau)
11e division d'infanterie (Breslau)

21e Brigade d'infanterie (Schweidnitz)
10e Régiment de grenadiers « König Ferdinand-Wilhelm II » (1er silésien) (Schweidnitz)
38e Régiment de fusiliers « General-Feldmarschal Graf von Moltke » (Glatz)
22e Brigade d'infanterie (Breslau)
11e Régiment de grenadiers « König Frederic III » (2e silésien)(Breslau)
51e Régiment d'infanterie (4e bas-silésien) (Breslau)
11e Brigade de cavalerie (Breslau)
1e Régiment de cuirassiers de la Garde du Corps « Grand Electeur » (silesien) (Breslau)
8e Régiment de dragons « König Frederic III » (2e silésien) (Oels)
11e Brigade d'artillerie de campagne (Breslau)
6e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne « von Peucker » (1e silésien) (Breslau)
42e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne (2e silésien) (Schweidnitz)
12e division d'infanterie (Neisse)

23e Brigade d'infanterie (Gleiwitz)
22e Régiment d'infanterie "Keith" (1e haut silésien) (Gleiwitz, Katowitz)
156e Régiment d'infanterie (3e silésien) (Beuthen,Tarnowitz)
24e Brigade d'infanterie (Neisse)
23e Régiment d'infanterie « von Winterfeld » (2e haut silésien) (Neisse))
62e Régiment d'infanterie (3e haut silésien) (Cosel,Ratibor)
78e Brigade d'infanterie (Brieg)
63e Régiment d'infanterie (4e haut silésien) (Oppeln,Lublinitz)
157e Régiment d'infanterie (4e silésien) (Brieg)
12e Brigade de cavalerie (Neisse)
4e Régiment de hussards « Von Schill » (1e silésien) (Ohlau)
6e Régiment de hussards « Graf von Götzen » (1e silésien) (Leobschutz)
44e Brigade de cavalerie (Gleiwitz)
2e Régiment de uhlans « Von Katzer » (silésien) (Gleiwitz)
11e Régiment de chasseurs à cheval (Tarnowitz)
12e Brigade d'artillerie de campagne (Neisse)
21e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne « von Clauzewitz » (1e haut silésien) (Neisse, Grottkau)
57e Régiment d'artillerie de campagne (2e haut silésien) (Neustadt, Gleiwitz)
Éléments non endivisionnés (ENE)

6 e Régiment de chasseurs à pied (2e haut silésien) (Oels)
3 e Détachement de mitrailleuses attaché au 51e Régiment d'infanterie (Breslau)
6 e Régiment d'artillerie à pied « von Dieskau » (silésien) (Neisse)
6 e Bataillon du génie (silésien) (Neisse)
6e Groupe du Train des Equipages (silésien) (Breslau)

Le VIIIe Corps d'armée de réserve (Koblenz)
War Journal of the 1e R.I.C. of 22 August 1914 in three foto copies (*).

2cckxld.jpg


bjistt.jpg


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War Journal of the 7e R.I.C. of 22 August 1914 in three foto copies.
Remark the list of the regimental losses of only one day, in the margin of the right page of the third Photo copy:
“Killed or disappeared: 29 officers; 946 soldiers. Wounded 6 officers, 316 soldiers”.
The Germans must have decimated this regiment to about 25% of it’s original force!

a2yxr8.jpg


iqeqsx.jpg


33nfe5t.jpg


After refreshing my knowledge and now knowing this all, Joe, and, I will go on in search for the rather seldom period pictures of the units of the 3e D.I.C.. So, thanks for this challenging question. The process of finding the correct information learns me a lot and gives me also much pleasure.

Of course, I do hope that my perhaps too elaborate info is not superfluous here, and that it will be helpful for you and other interested forum members in one way or another. If not, then accept my excuses. From now on: only period photo’s of units of 3e D.I.C., if I can find these. Please, have some patience.

(*) Source of these war journals is the official, French government website: SGA - Defense - France - Memoire des Hommes .
 
To be clear, I expect that I don’t posses any photo’s of the region of the Rossignol Battle at Belgium, nor of nowadays, nor of the times of the battle. Identifiable pictures of units of the 3rd DIC are hard to get. But I am still looking in my books and files, Joe. For now I can only show here some samples of artist impressions of the 1914 field equipment of French colonial infantrists and two 1914 period pictures concerning the French Colonial Infantry Regiments. I do realise, that this is almost like cursing in a church, showing these French pictures here on Picklehaubes. May I be forgiven for that. :-?

23w0lg8.jpg


10wln4l.jpg


w2kgmf.jpg


ilm6pu.jpg
 
Pierre and Robert,

That is all absolutely perfect! Robert absolutely nailed it, as usual, I explained it poorly. Especially given the Memorial. I was wondering if you had done one of your wonderful pieces on this specific engagement. Maybe this thread will push you in that direction???

I have to get my thoughts together. I have just returned from 18 holes of golf in pretty grueling weather. The reason I asked this question is that I am just starting to probe the entire concept/myth of rifle fire and casualties. Now that I have finished writing the book, and we did a lot of concept work on changes in tactics and doctrine of the German army prior to World War I. I am now thinking a step further. So many English language texts/stories are filled with the almost certain knowledge that the British expeditionary force, stopped the German army and Mons through some sort of uncanny skill with a rifle that the German army did not possess. English-language sources have been absolutely singing this chorus, but I am not sure that it all adds up to the casualty figures. I mean, the losses were terrible from a suffering basis, but statistically, I think they were off by a huge percentage. My initial feeling is that the German casualties were not that bad -- at least not as bad as English-language dogma would have it. There is not a lot of English-language background from French encounters. The battle, I am probing saw unbelievable casualty levels caused by the German army that far exceeded Mons. English language sources have not spent a lot of time looking at this or the surrounding engagements, because they did not involve English-speaking troops. Therefore the histories done in the English language do not analyze this well-at least this is my very initial impression. So I thought I would ask what you had? :pale: :pale: :pale:

Robert I am familiar with the book. It was apparently locally produced in a limited run, and extremely unfortunately for me done in French. That's why I lean so much on members of this forum like Pierre to help me with this inadequacy. Like I said I am just starting on this. :nike: :nike:

Pierre everyone likes to see French soldiers on this forum! Larry posts them all the time on the Franco Prussian war. They are very welcome! :sunny: :sunny:
 
I am glad that my search for info was useful, Joe.
I did found one other interesting fact about the Batlle of Rossignol in Barbara Tuchman’s classic standard “The Guns of August”. The French lost at Rossignol even their divisional commander, General Raffenel, and a Brigade General, Rondoney.

One of the reasons, why I don’t spend attention yet on my website to places of battles of 1914 around Liege and Dinant etc., is, that I prefer to concentrate on the front after the Race at the Sea, when it froze in the static trenches war at the end of 1914. And even then the front was never a static line at all, with always interchanging the possession of the lines and salients. I still have a lot of work to do and other sites to cover of the “frozen” front, Joe, like for instance the sector between Pont à Mousson and Nancy, Cambrai, and the Oise sector. Although I am extending all the time, I am aware that my website is not complete yet.

I read somewhere that only one out of three bullets were correctly directed at the opponents (which does not mean the hit was also successful). When there was no urgent reason for a kill, a lot of soldiers would shoot above or next of their opponents. Soldiers were not yet trained in the right fighting spirit, like they do nowadays after the Second World War. Artillery grenades were also very unreliable; only one out of three would explode. Of course next to hasty fabrication, and using the wrong type of shells like shrapnel for areas with barbed wire, the muddy soil along the battlefield helped a lot to prevent the detonation of many grenades.

I also sometimes am bothered by the British attitude about the Retreat from Mons and that they would have saved the positive outcome of the later Battle of the Marne. You wrote: “There is not a lot of English-language background from French encounters”. British battlefield guides even end at the east of the front at St. Mihiel sector, and forget easily that there was still over 350 km of front, covered by the French and in 1918 also by the Americans. Many British books forget to mention the French successes at the first day of the battle of the Somme and are often very sloppy about mentioning correctly the fighting German units below the level of a Division and the casualties toll on the German side. Before I will be boring by mentioning more examples, Joe, I will only remark, that I understand and subscribe your critical opinion.
My photo impressions about the Marne Battles, and especially that one about the Retreat from Mons shows a plague in Néry dedicated to the 2nd Dragoon Guards with the inscription: “The Battle of the Marne was won at Néry”.
Which is to my opinion and with all due respect for the retreating 2nd Dragoon Guards totally bullchips. The success of the first Battle of the Marne lies, quickly said, in the mistake of coordination of the operations between the 1st and 2nd German Army, and Galliéni’s alertness to turn the tide on the right moment with his Army of Paris and deploying colonials troops like Algerian Zouaves. Of course it is still undeniable that the retreated, heavily beated B.E.F. played also an important role, for instance at La Ferté au Jouarre, in the success of the First Battle of the Marne.
So, these are some reasons why I always try to check more sources than only British sources. But alas the German sources, as you will all know, are not that easily accessible as the French sources are.
And one thing, I detected, is common in all sources, even the Dutch: a kind of subliminal chauvinism or sometimes even taking sides, like the old history books of the twenties did. These were always talking about the “positions of the enemy”, instead of the “positions of the Germans”.

If you need any help with French translations, Joe, please write me a PM.
 
Thank You Pierre,

There has recently been a lot of discussion on the great war forum about German casualty accounting. My interest is somewhat different. I am not so interested in the statistics themselves nor their validity, rather I am more into the doctrine and if/how it was applied. The follow on would be then that changes made to doctrine. I am not satisfied with the English language dogma that French casualties were caused by a flawed doctrine of offense. I could be wrong, but I think the Germans had something to do with those casualties. These were primarily meeting engagements. But like I said, I am just starting....

I read somewhere that only one out of three bullets were correctly directed at the opponents (which does not mean the hit was also successful). When there was no urgent reason for a kill, a lot of soldiers would shoot above or next of their opponents. Soldiers were not yet trained in the right fighting spirit, like they do nowadays after the Second World War. Artillery grenades were also very unreliable; only one out of three would explode. Of course next to hasty fabrication, and using the wrong type of shells like shrapnel for areas with barbed wire, the muddy soil along the battlefield helped a lot to prevent the detonation of many grenades.

I am not positive that this has changed so much over the ages. The one third figure may be a little high.... :guns:
 
I wonder how good the edited book "The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914" by T. Zuber is. I guess it is natural that English literature focuses more on the battles with British/American participation.

Despite the losses suffered, the dogged resistance of the French armies also inflicted much damage to the German forces as well as their logistic situation. This had a large impact on the following battles and the combined French/English success of bringing the frontier to a halt.
 
The Battle of the Frontiers Ardennes 1914" by T. Zuber

I have ordered this and it was not one of my cheap finds. I have read a ton of reviews and a bunch of excerpts. I approach it with great trepidation. I really enjoyed reading the whole Zuber thing on the Schlieffen plan and commit several pages to it in the book. I think the debate is fascinating, and I think Zuber brings up points that are not refuted. However, sometimes it is very difficult to read his stuff. Good research-difficult reading-and seems to believe that the German soldier was 10 feet tall and invincible. So I will read it and try to withhold judgment.
 
Joe, you wrote:
There has recently been a lot of discussion on the great war forum about German casualty accounting. My interest is somewhat different. I am not so interested in the statistics themselves nor their validity,
I am aware of this phenomenon, for instance about the casualties numbers of Verdun. My guests are asking about exact numbers or are discussing this with me. It is so hard to be exact with contra speaking sources and new developments and facts. So , hard numbers of cuasualties hardly exist or are not available anymore.
I am more interested with the conditions of the terrain, the weather conditions of the time like thirst in summer and frozen feet in the winter.
A hill like Messines Ridge in Belgium is only about 60m. high. But if you stand at the foot of the ridge on the New Zealand or Irish side 60 m can be quite steep under conditions of constant fire. 5oo meter in peace time is a piece of cake distance to walk, in wartimes it was a time consuming hell of a job to do. Meldegänger, ordonnanses, and messengers, therefore were often brave men going from a commandpost to the frontlines and back, taking hours to cover only some 2 or 3 km. That is the intrigue for me of the landscape and the scarce relics of 90 years ago, like traces of trenches and concrete bunkers.
I am not satisfied with the English language dogma that French casualties were caused by a flawed doctrine of offense.
As always, there is also some truth in this view. The French Generals and officers were very harsh for their soldiers until the 1917 mutinies. The French executed the most of all their own soldiers for "cowardice in the face of the enemy". After the mutinies the French hold the line with a low morale but still defending, if necescary, until the Americans came along for the last offensives.
The tactic of attacking to the utmost, "Attaquer à l'Outrance", Joffre's personal credo, changed only someways in 1916, but caused always a terrible and needless waist of men; indeed "a flawed doctrine of offense".
It depends in which period of the war, you look at it. The French in 1914 were brave defenders at the Somme (read the positive German comments about their ennemies for instance in Sheldon's book), even fierce attackers in the Vosges, and later at the Marne. If a British regiment takes over a sector in late 1917, I can imagine that they would have find the French trenches "latrines", caused by the low morale of the times. A war, nor a front line are static items, and there is always some movement going on.
Have a nice day! :)
 
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